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Abstract—Assignment of critical missions to unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV) is bound to widen the grounds for adversar-
ial intentions in the cyber domain, potentially ranging from
disruption of command and control links to capture and use
of airborne nodes for kinetic attacks. Ensuring the security
of electronic and communications in multi-UAV systems is of
paramount importance for their safe and reliable integration
with military and civilian airspaces. Over the past decade, this
active field of research has produced many notable studies and
novel proposals for attacks and mitigation techniques in UAV
networks. Yet, the generic modeling of such networks as typical
MANETs and isolated systems has left various vulnerabilities out
of the investigative focus of the research community. This paper
aims to emphasize on some of the critical challenges in securing
UAV networks against attacks targeting vulnerabilities specific to
such systems and their cyber-physical aspects.
Index Terms—UAV, Cyber-Physical Security, Vulnerabilities
I. INTRODUCTION
The 21st century is scene to a rapid revolution in our
civilization’s approach to interactions. Advancement of com-
munication technologies, combined with an unprecedentedly
increasing trust and interest in autonomy, are pushing mankind
through an evolutionary jump towards delegation of challeng-
ing tasks to non-human agents. From mars rovers to search and
rescue robots, we have witnessed this trend of overcoming the
limitations inherent to us, through replacement of personnel
with cyber-physical systems capable of performing tasks that
are risky, repetitive, physically difficult or simply economically
infeasible for human actors.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, or UAVs, are notable exam-
ples of this revolution. Since the early 2000s, military and
intelligence theaters have seen an explosive growth in the
deployment of tactical UAVs for surveillance, transport and
combat operations. In the meantime, civilian use of UAVs has
gained traction as the manufacturing and operations costs of
small and mid-sized UAVs are undergoing a steady decline.
The cheaper cost of such UAVs has also led to a growing
interest in collaborative deployment of multiple UAVs to
perform specific tasks, such as monitoring the conditions
of farms and patrolling national borders. Yet, there are a
multitude of challenges associated with this vision, solving
which are crucial for safe and reliable employment of such
systems in civilian and military scenarios. One such challenge
is ensuring the security of systems that comprise UAVs,
as their remote operational conditions leave the burden of
command and control reliant on the onboard cyber-physical
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Fig. 1: Communication Links in a UAS Network
components. The body of literature on this issue has seen an
accelerated growth in recent years [1], which is partly due to
major cyber attacks on UAVs [2]. The overwhelming number
of potential vulnerabilities in UAVs indicates the need for
vigorous standards and frameworks for assurance of reliability
and resilience to malicious manipulations in all aspects of
UAVs, from the mechanical components to the information
processing units and communications systems.
In multi-UAV operations, Inter-UAV links are necessary
for exchange of situational and operational commands, which
are the basis of essential functions such as formation control
and task optimization. As for the architecture of these UAV
networks, the current consensus in the research community is
biased towards decentralized and ad hoc solutions, which allow
dynamic deployment of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
with minimal time and financial expenditure on pre-mission
preparations.
Structure of a typical UAS network is shown in Figure 1.
By considering the various types of links and interfaces
depicted in this figure, it can be deduced that such networks
are inherently of a complex nature. Integration of multiple
subsystems not only aggregates their individual vulnerabilities,
but may result in new ones that are rooted in the interactions
between those subsystems. Hence, UAS present the research
community with a novel interdisciplinary challenge. The aim
of this paper is to emphasize on some of the critical vulner-
abilities specific to network and communications aspects of
UAVs, and provide the research community with a list of open
problems in ensuring the safety and security of this growing
technology.
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II. UNIQUENESS OF UAS NETWORKS
Accurate analysis of vulnerabilities in UAS networks ne-
cessitates an understanding of how an airborne network differs
from traditional computer networks. Much of recent studies in
this area compare UAS networks to Mobile Ad hoc Networks
(MANETs) and Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), as UAS
communications and protocols may initially seem similar to
those of generic distributed and mobile networks. Yet differ-
ences in mobility and mechanical degrees of freedom, as well
as their operational conditions, build the grounds for separate
classification of UAS networks. One such distinguishing factor
is the velocity of airborne vehicles, which may range up to
several hundreds of miles per hour. The high mobility of
airborne platforms increases the complexity of requirements
for the communications subsystem and many aspects of the
UAS network. In the link layer, management of links and
adaptation of access control has to be fast enough to accommo-
date tasks such as neighbor discovery and resource allocation
in an extremely dynamic environment. Likewise, the network
layer must be able to provide fast route discovery and path
calculation while preserving the reliability of the information
flow.
In the physical layer, not only communications, but the
kinetic aspects of the UAS give rise to unique requirements.
As the span of a UAS network may vary from close-by clusters
to far and sparse distributions, the transmission power of UAV
radios must be adjustable for efficient power consumption and
sustained communications. Also, since the geography and en-
vironment of the mission may vary rapidly, channel availability
in UAS links is subject to change. A potential solution is
for the UAS to be equipped with Dynamic Spectrum Access
(DSA) and adaptive radios to provide the required agility. Fur-
thermore, the conventional antenna arrangement on airborne
platforms is such that changes in orientation and attitude of
the aircraft affect the gain of onboard radios. This problem is
further intensified in unmanned aircraft, as the elimination of
risk to human pilot allows longer unconventional maneuvers.
These considerations clarify the demand for a fresh vantage
point for analyzing the problem of security in UAS networks.
The reliability of today’s mission-critical UAVs need to be
studied with models that adopt a more inclusive view of such
systems and the impact of seemingly benign deficiencies on
the overall vulnerability of UAVs.
III. ANATOMY OF A UAV
UAVs are cyber-physical systems, meaning that their op-
erations are reliant on the interaction between physical and
computational elements of the system. Consequently, security
of a UAV is dependent not only on the computation and
communications elements and protocols, but also on the phys-
ical components of the system [3]. This heavy entanglement
of traditionally independent components requires a thorough
framework for analysis of security issues in UAVs to be
inclusive of the entire airframe. One obstacle in developing
such a framework is the variety of UAV architectures and
capabilities which makes the design of a generic model
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Fig. 2: Sensing and Communication Components of a UAV
difficult. Yet, the similarity of fundamental requirements of
such systems allows for generation of a high level system
model for conventional types of UAVs. Figure 2 depicts
a breakdown of components in a conventional UAV. Most
UAVs contain multiple communication antennas, including
air to ground (ATG), air to air (ATA), satellite data link
and navigation antennas, along with a set of sensors. The
positioning and navigation of a UAV is typically consisted
of a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver for
accurate positioning, and an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU)
for relative positioning based on readings from kinetic sensors.
This subsystem can be further extended to include air traffic
monitors such as ADS-B and collision avoidance systems.
Inside the fuselage, one or more processors supervise the
operation and navigation of the UAV, using the output of
various radios and sensors for adjustment of electronic and
mechanical parameters. This process is performed by adaptive
control mechanisms, many of which are dependent on feed-
back loops. Each of the elements mentioned in this section
may become the subject of malicious exploitation, leading the
UAV into undesirable states and critical malfunctions.
IV. OVERVIEW OF POTENTIAL ATTACKS
Table I lists some of the uninvestigated attacks on UAS
networks, categorized according to both network functionali-
ties and cyber-physical factors. The table emphasizes on the
criticality of the security problem, as the potential for vul-
nerability exists in every major component, ranging from the
outer fuselage and antennas to network layers and application
stack. This section provides an overview on the attacks listed in
Table I, and presents preliminary ideas on potential mitigating
approaches and areas of research.
A. Sensors and Navigation
Absence of a human pilot from the airframe of UAVs
puts the burden of observing the environment on the set of
sensors onboard the aircraft. Whether autonomous or remotely
piloted, sensors are the “eyes and ears” of the flight controller
and provide the environmental measurements necessary for
safe and successful completion of the mission. However,
malicious exploitation of sensors in critical cyber-physical
systems is widely neglected in vulnerability assessment of
TABLE I: Cyber-Physical Attacks on UAS Networks
Component Attacks
Sensors Visual Navigation Jamming
and Spoofing
Physical
Layer
Adaptive radios: deceptive at-
tacks on spectrum sensing
Antennas: Disruption and
Deception of Direction of
Arrival estimator, Beamnull-
induced Jamming
Orientation: Self-disruption by
Induction of Defensive Maneu-
vers
Link Layer Topology Inference, Topologi-
cal Vulnerability of Formation
to Adaptive Jamming, Routing
attacks
Network
Layer
Traffic Analysis, Disruption of
Convergence
Air Traffic
Control
ADS-B Spoofing, TCAS-
Induced Collisions
Fault
Handling
Manipulation of fault detection
such systems. An attacker may manipulate or misuse sensory
input or functions to trigger or transfer malware, misguide the
processes dependent on such sensors, or simply disable them
to cause denial of service attacks and trigger undesired fail-
safe mechanisms [4].
For navigational measurements, GNSS and IMU units are
traditionally used in tandem to provide accurate positioning of
the aircraft. It is well-known that GNSS signals, such as GPS,
are highly susceptible to spoofing attacks. The report in [5]
demonstrates that UAVs that only rely on commercial GPS
receivers for positioning are vulnerable to relatively simple
jamming and spoofing attacks, which may lead to crash or
capture of the UAV by adversaries. Since the establishment of
GPS, various countermeasures against GNSS spoofing have
been proposed, ranging from exploitation of direction and
polarization of the received GPS signal for attack detection
to beamforming and statistical signal processing methods for
elimination of spoofing signals [6]. However, the speed and
spatial freedom of UAVs render many of the basic assumptions
and criteria of such techniques inapplicable. In [7], the authors
propose the cross-examination of variations in IMU and GPS
readings for detection of spoofing attacks from anomalies in
fused measurements. While theoretically attractive, practical
deployment of this technique requires highly reliable IMUs
and adaptive threshold control for an efficient performance,
which are economically undesirable for the small UAVs indus-
try. Such practical limitations in accuracy and implementation
leave this detection technique ineffective to advanced spoofing
attacks, demonstrating the insufficiency of current civilian
GNSS technology for mission-critical applications.
Fusion of IMU and GNSS systems with other sensors, such
as video camera, may lessen the possibility of spoofing. Yet,
vision-based navigation is also subject to attacks, the simplest
of which is blinding the camera by saturating its receptive
sensors with high intensity laser beams. A more sophisticated
attack may aim for deception of the visual navigation system:
In smaller areas, homogenizing or periodically modifying the
texture of the terrain beneath a camera-equipped UAV may
cause miscalculations of movement and orientation. Investi-
gating the effect of such attacks on the control loop of a
fused positioning system may determine the feasibility of such
attacks and potential mitigation techniques.
Detection of attacks on the navigation subsystem is the basis
of reactive countermeasures, such as triggering of hovering or
return-to-base mechanisms. However, as the following section
demonstrates, fault-handling mechanisms are also potential
subjects to malicious manipulation. Robustness of the sensory
and navigational subsystem against spoofing attacks may be
further improved by implementation of proactive mechanisms
through elimination of spoofing signals, applicability of which
to UAVs is yet to be investigated.
B. Fault Handling Mechanisms
Even with the stringent reliability requirements of UAVs,
mechanical and electronic subsystems of UAVs remain prone
to faults due to physical damage and unpredicted state tran-
sitions. Therefore, critical UAV systems must consider the
possibility of faults and implement Fault Handling mecha-
nisms to reduce the impact of such events on the system.
Typical examples of fault handling mechanisms are entering
a hovering pattern when temporary faults occur, return-to-
base for persistent faults and self-destruction in the event
of fatal faults such as capture or crash. In remotely oper-
ated systems, fault handling mechanisms may be triggered
automatically once a certain fault is detected. This process
adds yet another attack surface to UAS networks, as the fault
detection mechanisms may be subject to manipulation [8].
For instance, if a temporary disruption of communications
triggers the hovering pattern of a UAV, an adversary can jam
the link to bind the motion of the aircraft, thus simplify its
kinetic destruction or physical capture. A more severe case is
when sensory manipulation allows the induction of capture
conditions on a tactical UAV, thereby triggering its auto-
destruction mechanism.
C. Air Traffic Control (ATC) and Collision Avoidance
Integration of unmanned vehicles with national and inter-
national airspaces requires guarantees on safety and reliability
of UAV operations. One major consideration in the safety
of all airborne operations -manned and unmanned- is sit-
uation awareness and collision avoidance. Modern manned
aircraft in the major civilian airspaces are equipped with
secondary surveillance technologies such as Automatic De-
pendent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B), which allow each
aircraft to monitor the air traffic in their vicinity. This infor-
mation, along with other available means of traffic monitoring,
provide situation awareness to the Traffic advisory and Col-
lision Avoidance System (TCAS), which monitors the risk of
collision with other aircraft and generates advisories on how
to prevent collisions.
With the growing interest in large-scale deployment of
UAVs, implementation of similar technologies in UAS is
crucial. Recent literature contain several proposals on TCAS
and ATC solutions for UAVs, many of which are based on
adaptation of ADS-B and commercial TCAS protocols. From
a security point of view, this approach suffers from several
critical vulnerabilities, rendering it unfeasible for mission-
critical UAS applications. Firstly, ADS-B is an insecure proto-
col by design [1]. Lack of authentication and the unencrypted
broadcast nature of this protocol make room for relatively
simple attacks, ranging from eavesdropping to manipulation
of air traffic data by jamming or injection of false data.
Consequently, a TCAS system relying on ADS-B can produce
erroneous results and advisories, leading to unwanted changes
in the flight path or in the worst scenario, collisions.
Also, TCAS is shown to be susceptible to a flaw known as
“TCAS-Induced Collisions” [9]. Common implementations of
TCAS are not equipped with prediction capabilities to foresee
the longer-term effect of an advisory that they produce. In
dense traffic conditions, certain scenarios may cause the TCAS
to generate advisories that lead to a state where avoidance
of collision is not possible. Hence, an adversary capable
of manipulating the traffic data can intentionally orchestrate
conditions leading to TCAS-induced collisions. Authors of [9]
provide an example of this flaw for a 4 airplane scenario,
as illustrated in Figure 3. In this scenario, UAV1 and UAV2
are initially in a collision path, hence the TCAS in each
generates a collision avoidance advisory to descend and climb,
respectively. At a lower altitude, the same situation holds for
UAV3 and UAV4, causing UAV4 to climb, which puts UAV1
and UAV4 on a collision path. Even though that TCAS does
not fail to generate new correction advisories in both UAVs,
but the advisory is no longer practical as there is not enough
time before the collision to implement the new path.
D. Physical Layer
Typical UAVs require multiple radio interfaces to retain
continuous connectivity with essential links to satellite relays,
ground control stations and other UAVs. This degree of com-
plexity, along with the physical and mechanical characteristics
of UAVs, widen the scope of potential vulnerabilities and
enable multiple attacks that are specific to UAS networks. This
section presents a discussion on some of such attacks on the
physical layer of UAV nodes.
1. Adaptive Radios: As the operational environment of UAS
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Scenario
networks is highly dynamic, sustained and reliable communi-
cations necessitates the employment of radios that are capable
of adjusting to changes in propagation and links conditions.
Depending on the operational requirements, this adaptability
may apply to any of the physical layer parameters such
as transmit power, frequency, modulation, and configuration
of antennas. The procedure responsible for controlling these
parameters must essentially rely on environmental inputs,
which can be manipulated by adversaries to result in unde-
sirable configurations. This issue is analogous to deceptive
attacks on the spectrum sensing process of cognitive radio
networks, for which various mitigation techniques have been
proposed based on anomaly detection and fusion of distributed
measurements [10]. However, the rapid variation of conditions
in a UAS network may lead to situations where determination
of a baseline for anomaly detection is not practical. The
same consideration also develops a necessity for rapid adjust-
ments, which limits the acceptable amounts of redundancy and
overhead. Similarly, deployment of airborne nodes in hostile
environments further reduces the feasibility of relying on
real-time collaboration between distributed sensors. Therefore,
such countermeasures will not be sufficient for agile UAS
radios and novel solutions must be tailored according to the
unique requirements of airborne networks.
2. Antennas: The current trend in antenna selection for UAV
radios is favored towards omnidirectional antennas, defined
by their relatively homogeneous reception and transmission
in all directions of the horizontal or vertical planes. This
feature simplifies communications in mobile nodes, as the
homogeneity of gain eliminates the need for considering the
direction of transmissions. On the other hand, the indiscrim-
inate nature of omnidirectional antennas extends the attack
surface for eavesdroppers and jammers, since they also do
not need to tune towards the exact direction of radios to
implement their attacks. A countermeasure against this class of
attack is the utilization of directional antennas, which can only
communicate in certain directions and are “blind” to others.
Besides their higher security, other advantages of directional
antennas include longer transmission ranges and spatial reuse,
thus providing a higher network capacity. One downside
associated with this approach is the inevitable escalation of
overhead. Maintaining directional communications in highly
mobile networks is a complex and costly task, as it requires
real-time knowledge of other nodes’ positions, as well as
employment of antennas capable of reconfiguring their beam
patterns.
To overcome the disadvantages of these two approaches, a
midway solution combining the simplicity of omnidirectional
radios and spatial selectivity of directional antennas can be
actualized in the form of beamforming antenna arrays. Such
antennas are capable of detecting the Direction of Arrival
(DoA) of individual signals. This measurement, along with
other system parameters, are then used to electronically recon-
figure the radiation pattern and directionality of the antenna
array. Beamforming has been studied as a mitigation technique
against jamming attacks, as it allows spatial filtering of the
jammer’s signals by adjusting the antenna pattern such that a
null is placed towards the direction of the jammer [11]. The
accuracy and efficiency of this technique depends on correct
detection of the jamming signal, as well as the resolution of
beamformer’s DoA estimations. An adversary may attack the
DoA estimator by shaping its jamming signals to mimic wave-
forms of a nearby legitimate node, thus avoiding detection or
causing false detections.
Another attack scenario exploits the process of beamnulling
itself. In an ad hoc UAS network, beamnulling must be
implemented in a distributed fashion to allow targeted nodes to
retain or regain connectivity with the network independently.
Due to lack of coordination, nulls created by one node
towards a jammer may also null the direction of legitimate
signals. Depending on the mobility model and formation of the
network, an adversary may deploy multiple mobile jammers
with strategically controlled trajectories to manipulate the DoA
measurements, and eventually cause the network to null more
of its legitimate links than is necessary. In certain conditions,
the adversary can maximize the efficiency of jamming at-
tacks by persistently manipulating the distributed beamnulling
mechanism in such a way that its solution converges towards
a maximally disconnected state. Analytical studies into feasi-
bility criteria of this attack may produce insights into possible
countermeasures and mitigation techniques.
3. Orientation: As depicted in figure 2, a conventional
UAV employs multiple fixed antennas on different sides, each
of which is dedicated to a certain application. Consider the
ATG antenna which is placed on the lower side of the UAV.
As discussed previously, if the UAV performs a half-roll
maneuver or ascends with a steep climb angle, the ATG
antenna is no longer capable of communicating with the
ground antenna and therefore the ATG link is lost. This issue
can be exploited for jamming in UAS Networks that employ
the spatial retreat as a mitigation technique. By observing the
reaction of the nodes to jamming attacks, an adversary may
infer their reformation strategy, and adapt its attack such that
the defensive reformation of certain nodes leads to the loss of
some links due to the new orientation of antennas.
E. Link Layer and Formation
Similar to generic multihop wireless networks, the topology
of a UAS network is determined based on the location of
UAVs relative to each other: UAVs closer than a threshold
can directly communicate with each other, while those that
are farther must utilize relay nodes to reach their destination.
Knowledge of the topology of a network allows adversaries to
optimize attacks by analyzing the structure of their target and
determine the most vulnerable regions by identifying nodes
whose disconnection incur the maximum loss of connectivity
in the network. Even though the effect of topology on the
resilience of the network is widely studied, the proposed mit-
igation techniques fail to provide practical solutions for UAS
networks. A class of such solutions are based on a security
by obscurity approach, suggesting the employment of covert
communications between nodes to hide the topology of the
network from adversaries. Besides the undesirable overhead
of this approach in terms of decreased network throughput
and increased processing costs, it has been shown that the
topology of such networks can be estimated with a high degree
of accuracy via timing analysis attacks [12]. Therefore, hiding
the topology may not serve as a reliable solution in mission
critical scenarios.
An alternative mitigation technique is adaptive control of the
topology [13]. In this approach, detection of a jamming attack
triggers a reformation process during which the nodes of a
UAS network change their positions to retain connectivity. A
fundamental assumption of this approach is the ability of the
nodes to detect and localize attacks, which may not always be
practical. A promising area of further investigation is the prob-
lem of minimizing the topological vulnerability to targeted
jamming attacks. Development of real-time and distributed
formation control techniques that consider this optimization
problem may lead to highly efficient techniques for ensuring
dynamic resilience of mission-critical UAS networks.
A mitigation technique against topology inference attacks
is randomization of transmission delays. It is expected that
introducing randomness in forwarding delays weakens the
observed correlation between connected hops, and therefore
reduces the accuracy of timing analysis attacks. However,
the high mobility of UAS networks and the consequent re-
quirement for minimal latency limit the maximum amount of
delay permissible in such networks. This constraint limits the
randomness of the forwarding delays, which may neutralize
the effect of mitigation technique. A potential alternative for
delay randomization is transmission of decoy signals to perturb
the adversary’s correlation analysis. This proposal may be
extended by incorporating it in topology control, such that
the resultant formation is optimized for decoy transmissions
in a way that spatial distribution of traffic in the network
appears homogeneous to an outside observer, thereby inducing
an artificial correlation between all nodes in the network. To
the extent of authors’ knowledge, the feasibility, overhead
and optimal implementation of this approach are yet to be
analytically and experimentally studied.
F. Network Layer
The impact of high mobility in UAS networks is greatly
accentuated in the network layer. Speed and frequency of
changes in the topology of a UAS network give rise to
many challenges that are still active subjects of research. Yet,
studies on security of routing mechanisms tend to follow the
tradition of equating UAS networks with MANETs. Indeed,
the unique features of unmanned airborne networks generate
a set of challenges in the network layer that do not match the
criteria of conventional MANETs. The highly dynamic nature
of UAS networks, as well as stringent requirements on latency,
necessitate novel routing mechanisms capable of calculating
paths in rapidly changing topologies. A survey of the state of
the art in this area is presented in [14]. The proposed methods
may be prone to potential vulnerabilities, and the demand for a
detailed technical analysis and comparison of these proposals
in terms of their security is yet to be fulfilled.
Similar to the link layer, the routing layer of UAS networks
is also vulnerable to traffic analysis attacks, aiming to infer
individual flows, as well as source-destination pairs of end-to-
end connections. Various mitigation techniques against such
attacks have been proposed [15], many of which rely on tradi-
tional approaches such as mixing and decoy transmissions. As
such techniques require addition of redundancies and overhead
to the UAS networks, a comprehensive feasibility analysis and
optimal design of the corresponding defense strategies is vital,
but not yet available to the research community.
Mobile routing in UAS networks is a surface for attacks
on convergence of the network. As discussed, the topology
of unmanned airborne networks is subject to manipulation by
adversarial actions such as exploitation of adaptive formation
control and jamming attacks. Also, many of the recently
proposed routing mechanisms for airborne networks rely on
global knowledge of the geographical positions of every node
in the network, which may also be prone to manipulation.
A sophisticated adversary may be able to design a strategic
combination of topological perturbation and sensor manipu-
lations to prevent or slow the convergence of routing in the
network. Investigation of this attack in terms of feasibility, as
well as potential countermeasures may prove to be valuable
for efficient protection of UAS networks operating in hostile
environments.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The cyber-physical nature of UAVs demand an extension to
the scope of ordinary vulnerability analysis for such systems.
In addition to threats in the electronic and computational
components, a largely overlooked class of vulnerabilities is
fostered by the interactions between the mechanical elements
and the computational subsystems. Pondering on the list of
critical attacks presented in this paper, an alarming conclusion
can be drawn: serious threats still remain unmitigated not
only in every networking component of UAS communica-
tions, but also in the interdependency of the network and
other components, including sensors and physical elements
of UAVs. Considering the seriousness of open issues in the
cyber-physical aspects of UAVs, a successful move towards the
age of mainstream unmanned aviation cannot be envisioned
without remedying the void of effective solutions for such
critical challenges.
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